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to present comparative results which has been a chief factor in rendering the publication abortive. Moreover, the fact that the author's determinations of the normal difference limen for tones are twentyfold greater than the normal determinations of the most reliable workers in the field of psychological acoustics shows that there is something radically wrong with Dr. Miner's conditions of practice or of experimentation.

I believe that I have met all of the objections raised against my review. It is unnecessary to add that I stand by my original criticism. Dr. Miner seems to me to have been guilty of an error of judgment in the planning and conduct of his whole investigation. I am convinced, too, that he merits criticism for the imperfect character of his presentation. Whether I am right or wrong in these contentions I can only leave to the competent to decide.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Philosophy of F. H. Jacobi. ALEXANDER W. CRAWFORD. *Cornell Studies in Philosophy*, No. 6. The Macmillan Co. 1905. Pp. iii + 90.

A new presentation of this philosophy of realism, immediacy, experience and faith is certainly welcome in view of the prominence of these catchwords in contemporary discussion. Not that Jacobi throws any new light upon our controversies, for his thought is ill-defined, but it is interesting to note the form which the reaction against rationalism and sensationalism assumed in his writings. His personality, also, has much in it that is akin to some of the modern leaders of the new thought.

Professor Crawford's monograph is the result of an exhaustive study of his subject and his quotations and references give ample material for the reconstruction of Jacobi's system. His work appears to be a labor of love, and where he errs it is largely due to his desire to give his subject the benefit of the most liberal interpretation possible. This is, indeed, to a certain extent justifiable in the case of men of the Platonic temperament whose contribution is an attitude rather than a system, yet when done it should be done explicitly and clearly. There seems to be, also, a certain looseness in the use of such fundamental terms as realism, idealism and immediate, which makes the author's interpretations misleading. The term realism, especially, seems to irritate him as applied to Jacobi's philosophy because it suggests to him a materialistic interpretation of reality, its colorless epistemological meaning, which is that emphasized by Jacobi himself, being but grudgingly recognized. Certain inconsistencies of statement naturally result from these ambi-

guities but, taken as a whole, the book gives an extremely readable and complete account of this faith philosophy.

Jacobi's starting-point was the primacy of the heart over the head, and his whole philosophy was an attempt to interpret the world in such fashion as would validate life's practical ideals. The particular form of his doctrine was determined by his opposition to the prevailing rationalism of his day, the logical outcome of which he believed to be a Spinozistic pantheism incompatible with individual personality. As against such a conceptual system Jacobi stood for the primacy of life and experience as alone furnishing the reality which must be the correlate and standard of our thinking. But in this experience he discovered other elements than those furnished by sensation. Certain spiritual realities are presented immediately in feeling or reason which have as great a certitude as those of sense. God, as well as the world, is present in our lives, and of His reality we need, and can have, no other proof than that we find Him there. Sense and feeling are thus the coordinate sources of the data upon which all our thinking rests.

It is in the interpretation of the nature of this immediate spiritual intuition that our author's position seems doubtful. Criticizing the present reviewer's assertion that in the act of perception Jacobi makes the mind passive toward its object and that his whole doctrine of knowledge is really an attempt to rid knowledge of the thought element in it, Professor Crawford says, "This would be true only of Jacobi's earlier expositions of perception, when he called it a form of feeling, but it is the contention of this study that his later adoption of the word 'reason' in place of 'feeling' is a recognition, or a restoration, of the thought element in reason or judgment" (p. 47). It might be enough to place alongside of this passage the following: "The real, then, is given in perception rather than in thought or in ratiocination. Perception is real because it gives both thought and being. . . . Conception can not give objectivity; this is found only in perception, where alone actuality is given. In the same way reason (faith), as a form of perception, creates no concepts, builds no system, passes no judgments, but, like the external sense, merely reveals and positively makes known" (p. 59). Jacobi's whole philosophy is built upon this contrast between mediacy and immediacy, between that knowledge which is the result of reflection and subject to proof, and that which is given and not susceptible to proof. That the receptivity of the mind may itself be viewed as a kind of activity does not affect his position that the objects of faith are not known through a process, or that perception and thought are distinct. That such a conception of pure immediacy is not capable of being consistently carried out is no ground for denying that it was actually held. This the author appears to recognize when he says, "If Jacobi's view of immediacy were possible at all, it would render *self*-consciousness impossible. . . . All this Jacobi felt in a way; and only in so far as he got beyond the standpoint of immediacy did he formulate a philosophy at all." Which is only to say that he failed to hold fast to what was his real principle.

The author's discussion of Jacobi's realism is even more uncertain in tenor. He is uneasy at the idea of classing him as a realist and yet is forced to do so, formally at least. His trouble lies in his failure to understand what this realism means in this connection. Jacobi believed that our experience is not a mere train of subjective mental states, sensations and ideas, but that real objects are given us immediately and are the objects to which our thought refers. "In the first and simplest perception there must be the 'I' and the 'thou,' inner consciousness and external object existing together in the soul: both in the same indivisible moment, without before or after, without any operation of the understanding, nay, even without in the slightest degree beginning the production of the concept of cause and effect" (p. 57). Real objects, not ideas, are thus the primary data of knowledge and, though independent of us, given in our experience. They are revealed to us as things beyond us, yet within us. Their being known by us adds nothing to their reality, which is the condition of our accidental knowing of them. And this reality which objects have is not a mere phenomenal reality, such as Kant ascribed to the objects of knowledge, but is a complete noumenal reality, so that our author's assertion that Jacobi is no 'more of a realist than Kant' is hard to understand. It is quite true that the most important, if not ultimately all, realities are for Jacobi of a spiritual nature, subjects rather than substances, yet this is obviously beside the question of the relation of our knowledge to its object. With his insistence upon the ultimate significance of the individual person and the impossibility of turning faith into knowledge, Jacobi would have been the last to accept the monism of the Hegelian idealism. Such a monism was for him always the type of a rational philosophy, but, as such, always the proof that a rational philosophy was inadequate as a formulation of reality. As an upholder of the doctrine of the primacy and independence of spiritual reals, Jacobi must be looked upon as the founder of the realistic opposition to that line of idealists of whom Kant was the first.

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Mathematical Emancipations. C. J. KEYSER. *Monist*, January, 1906. Pp. 65-83.

The clear and elementary account of the concept of dimensionality which Professor Keyser has given us under the above somewhat mystifying title is especially welcome, inasmuch as writers in our philosophic journals are wont to drag Kantianism into the discussion and so confuse the issue. We regret, however, to find the paper confined, for the most part, to the exposition of mathematical facts, ignoring the work of Poincaré,¹ who has presented essentially the same material and interpreted it with great philosophic insight.

The creation of manifolds by the act of discrimination, says Professor Keyser, is the most primitive manifestation of mind. The dimension-

¹ Cf. especially 'Science et Hypothèse,' Part 2. Paris, 1902.